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From the perspective of much of the literature dealing with Information Security Standards, the decision to adopt 
or follow such standards is mainly a technical decision subject to regulatory requirements. This paper explains 
why the decision to adopt an information security standard is one taken in a complex marketplace of competing 
standards, competing service providers, competing security design methods, and competing national and 
international legislative requirements, all under the oversight of closely watched audit firms and government 
regulators.  While the dependence on standards for guidance in information security is growing, so is the 
complexity of the decision.  The decision affects the economic justification of internal controls in information 
systems.  Without regulatory standards, risk economics are necessary to justify acquisition and implementation of 
controls.  With regulatory standards, risk economics are necessary to justify exceptions to the acquisition and 
implementation of controls.  The impact of this economic shift may drive down organizational competitiveness or 
increase misleading compliance behaviour among IT professionals. 
Keywords 
Information systems security, risk management, security standards, risk analysis, compliance, governance 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a series of unfortunate corporate financial collapses worldwide, government legislative 
investigations led to a variety of legislation meant to improve the reliability and integrity of information provided 
by corporations to public shareholders.  Most of this legislation has more or less shifted oversight responsibility 
into the hands of government regulators.  While this regulation varied in extreme, the result has been a dramatic 
effect on the way information security safeguards are specified and evaluated. 
Perhaps the most extreme form of this government regulation of corporate governance is the U.S. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SarbOx).  It intends to regulate by law the requirements for the independence of public 
company auditors, ethical reporting to shareholders, and to more severely criminalize misrepresentations of 
corporate financial situations by senior executives.  While the Australian equivalent, the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9), is less extreme in shifting power from the professions to the government, 
it has many similar features. 
Such legislation has served to increase the emphasis placed by organizations on their internal accounting 
controls.  This increasing emphasis has driven requirements for more severe assurance audits of the information 
security safeguards designed into information systems.  These requirements are increasingly linked by auditors to 
established, recognized, information security standards and guidelines.  As a consequence the importance of 
information security standards and guidelines in the design and specification of information security safeguards is 
growing. 
However, the adoption of an information security standard is not a straightforward decision for many 
organizations.  It involves selecting a standard that will satisfy auditors, who by regulation are independent and 
required to be legally disconnected from the decision to adopt the standard.  Once adopted, the standard is likely 
to change the existing approaches most organizations use in establishing security requirements and designing 
security safeguards.  The interaction of information security standards and traditional practices of risk analysis 
are changed.  Further there are a variety of information security standards from which an organization may 
choose.  These include general standards, government standards, and product standards. 
In addition, there are a variety of external stakeholders involved in an organization's decision to adopt an 
information security standard.  Aside from the auditors, there may be government regulators, service providers 
with expertise in particular security standards, and company trading partners carrying baggage involving their 
own regulatory constraints.  This may require an international trading company to conform to regulations in other 
countries, invoking a sort of required extraterritorial legislative conformity.   
This paper explains why the decision to adopt an information security standard is one taken in a complex 
marketplace of competing standards, competing service providers, competing security design methods, and 
competing national and international legislative requirements, all under the oversight of closely watched audit 
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firms and government regulators.   While the dependence on standards for guidance in information security is 
growing, so is the complexity of the decision. 
To accomplish this goal, we will discuss the information security standards marketplace in four sections.  These 
include (1) competing national and international legislative requirements, (2) competing standards, competing 
service providers, (3) reoriented security design methods, and (4) audit firms and government regulators.  Figure 
1 illustrates these elements and the competition in the security standards marketplace that are discussed in this 
paper.  In this figure, information technology (IT) operations in publicly held firms are scrutinized by external 
audit firms (themselves scrutinized by government or professional regulatory bodies) in response to competing 
national and extraterritorial legal frameworks.  This scrutiny drives IT security designers to move the basis of 
security requirements definition toward one of the IT security standard.  These standards are competitive in the 
sense that each is different, and each has a variety of specialized IT Service Providers who advocate each 
standard.  Ultimately, the reoriented security design processes reshape the IT operations.  As audits, operations, 
and standards evolve under the effects of competing legislation and standards, security design processes and 




























Figure 1. Competition in the security standards marketplace. 
COMPETING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE 
REQUIREMENTS 
There were a wide variety of legislative responses to the abuses of ethics and corporate governance that led to a 
number of spectacular corporate failures in the 1990s.  We will select two for a brief comparison, namely the 
American SarbOx and the Australian CLERP 9.   
SarbOx is named after its sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael G. Oxley, and was 
approved by an overwhelming vote in the US legislature.  It consists of some 11 titles that provide new 
regulations for the accountability for corporate and criminal fraud, white-collar crime penalties, corporate tax 
returns, etc.  It has several provisions that have proven to be relevant for information security.  Of particular 
importance is Title IV, which deals with enhanced financial disclosures.  This title details company 
responsibilities for periodic financial reports, assessment of internal controls, codes of ethics, and other aspects 
of disclosures.  Section 404 regards the management assessment of internal controls.  It requires an "internal 
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control report", which means the organization must establish and maintain adequate internal control structures 
and procedures.  More importantly, the organization must assess their effectiveness and disclose this assessment 
in its normal reporting (AICPA, 2006). 
This required disclosure is generally interpreted to mean that the organization must report inadequate information 
security safeguards to its shareholders.  Both internal and external auditors have become embroiled under this 
provision in the evaluation of information security and especially of the security controls provided for 
information technology.  Many of these auditors are not trained to encounter either the information technology or 
the security of this technology.  Lacking deep knowledge in systems analysis and design, and also lacking 
knowledge in information systems security, these auditors are highly dependent on the recommended practices 
found in highly specified information security standards such as ISO 17799 and COBIT (discussed below). 
There are several factors that lead to difficulties between the auditors and the technology.  One of these is the 
sheer scope of being trained in both the audit specialty of accounting and information systems.  There are very 
few programs that currently provide this level of preparation for auditors.  Another factor is the requirement for 
auditor independence under Title II of SarbOx.  Title II deals with conflicts of interest in business relationships 
of audit firms and requires firms to take steps to unveil such conflicts.  In section 201 certain activities and 
service provision outside the scope of practice are prohibited.  This section makes it illegal for an external audit 
firm to provide non-audit services to companies during their audits.  For example, it prohibits a firm from 
providing information systems design and implementation services to its audit clients.  To a certain extent this 
limits the experience of members of audit firms.  Another factor is the innate difficulty of communication 
between two highly defined professions (namely accounting and information systems), each of which has its own 
jargon. 
As a result tension has developed between auditing and information systems.  While information systems 
specialists might see the auditors as poorly prepared for an internal audit of an IT system, the auditors may shift 
the blame to the IT specialists. There have been concerns that insular and incompetent information technology 
divisions will sabotage efforts to comply with SarbOx.  Accounting specialists have recommended that 
organizations take steps to improve their information specialists.  These specialists are seen to lack domain 
knowledge and internal control knowledge, and that these combine to create significant weaknesses in the 
controls in systems developed by information technology specialists.  Rather than train auditors on IT, some 
accounting authorities have recommended training IT specialists on internal control, risk awareness, and 
functional domain areas (Cannon and Growe, 2004). 
From the perspective of some of those faced with this auditing challenge, an alternative to the conversion of weak 
IT departments would be to outsource the IT altogether.  This outsourcing is seen to eliminate a weak company 
staff and its problems with internal politics.  This elimination is also seen to improve management satisfaction 
with internal IT.  Because this management decision is often needed in the context of an internal audit, rather 
than training auditors in IT, it might be more appropriate to train these auditors about when and where to 
outsource IT (Lanz and Tie, 2004). 
While SarbOx is developing into such a stringent set of IT security requirements that some organizations are 
advised to get rid of IT altogether, the Australian approach is softer.  CLERP 9 is based on disclosure rather than 
prescriptive rules (The Treasury, 2002).  Like SarbOx, CLERP 9 regulates auditor independence, periodic 
reporting, and corporate certification of financial reports.  While the Australian program is less prescriptive, 
imposes fewer obligations, and draws short of criminalizing reporting deficiencies of executives, the ethical 
purpose is similar. CLERP 9 establishes new standards for auditor independence that are broadly similar to 
SarbOx and periodic reporting requirements that provide continuous disclosure.  While executives are not 
required to certify the maintenance of internal controls, they are required to certify to the directors of the 
company that the financial statements comply with accounting standards and represent the true and fair view of 
the current financial position of the company (Grey and Dale, 2005). 
While CLERP 9 is less of a rule-based approach to regulating the ethics of corporate governance, SarbOx can be 
more invasive.  In certain fairly common situations, such as those involving global companies with publicly held 
American subsidiaries or publicly held American companies that are closely dependent on foreign trading 
partners, SarbOx compliance certification may be required for foreign companies.  This opens the possibility, for 
example, in which a firm may be required to be compliant with both SarbOx and CLERP 9.  The two systems are 
similar enough to permit parallel compliance.  While the separate governments’ provisions differ only in 
immaterial ways, Australian companies that must additionally comply with SarbOx must invest additional time 
and resources with the obvious impact on overhead costs and therefore competitiveness.  SarbOx, being the more 
restrictive legislative framework, is consequently becoming a form of legislation known as “extraterritorial law”.  
The act can be seen to override national regulatory authorities in other countries, such as the case where SarbOx 
takes precedence over CLERP 9 in parallel compliance situations.  While there are no obvious conflicts in 
parallel compliance in terms of internal auditing, some conflicting problems between SarbOx and other national 
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regulations have arisen, particularly in the area of attorney-client confidentiality (LexisNexis, 2003).  The 
potential for future conflict is present. 
COMPETING STANDARDS AND COMPETING SERVICE PROVIDERS 
A recently published study of worldwide information security risk management practices has shown that the use 
of information security standards in developing the security requirements for information systems has become a 
global best practice (Baskerville, 2005).  For example, 41% of surveyed companies are following ISO 17799, 
21% are following CobIT and 17% are following BS 7799 (these categories are not exclusive). 
The rise of the use of security standards is connected with difficulties in using traditional risk analysis 
calculations for developing economic justification for the acquisition of security controls.  The study shows that 
only about 25% of the surveyed organizations are using serious risk analysis approaches.  This risk analysis 
approach involves complex calculations on questionable data and consequently fails to economically justify some 
of the most basic and essential security safeguards.  Instead, it seems, most organizations are following a security 
standard.  Justification for the acquisition of proper safeguards according to an internationally recognized 
standard may carry more weight with management that using economic risk analysis. 
Because the internal auditors are reaching for the standards in the audit of systems for SarbOx compliance, it 
becomes more rational to use widely recognized standards as the basis for selecting and implementing controls in 
the first place.  As long as the auditors use the same standard as the system designers, and the safeguards are 
operated properly, SarbOx compliance certification is more likely. 
There are competing standards.  Table 1 lists examples of these standards in comparison to their scope.  Some 
standards are international in scope while others are promulgated by national governments.  Still others are 
developed by professional organizations as standards of professional practice.  Finally there are security 
standards promoted by industry groups.   
 
Scope of Standards Examples 





Government Standards ACS133 
BS 7799 
German IT Baseline Protection Manual 
US NIST 800 Series 
Professional Standards CobIT 
ITIL 
Industry Standards PCI 
Table 1.  Examples of standards of differing scope. 
A notable front runner is the ISO/IEC 17799:2005. This standard provides a security management framework, 
and detailed recommendations for security policies along with a wide variety of specific safeguards and controls 
such as access control, communications controls, physical security, personnel security, etc.  (ISO/IEC, 2005).  
This standard was developed from the original British Standard, BS 7799, and with the endorsement of the 
International Standards Organization, has substantial adherents. 
But another front runner is CobIT, Control Objectives for IT (2005a).  This standard is growing in importance 
because of its tight connection with compliance under SarbOx.  The standard evolved from the more general 
internal audit compliance framework from the “Committee of Sponsoring Organizations” (COSO).  The 
development of CobIT within the COSO framework means that the controls recommended from this standard are 
highly consistent with standard auditing frameworks (Edelstein, 2004).  Not surprisingly, CobIT has more appeal 
when the controls standards are invoked because of SarbOx compliance.  Auditors find the framework within 
which this set of controls is developed to be more familiar and consistent with audit reports. 
Standards such as ISO 17799 and CobIT are available for selection to guide organizations in specifying 
requirements for their information security.  The standards are not entirely conflicting.  At the basic level, the 
safeguards and controls recommended by both standards are rather similar and entirely compatible.  However, 
definitions for the processes by which safeguards and controls are specified and acquired are more complete and 
independent in the ISO standard than in the CobIT standard (von Solms, 2005).  The similarities and differences 
between these two front running standards suggest that the adoption decision for the appropriate standard will be 
based on a number of factors aside from the exact controls requirements of an internal audit.  These decisions 
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will also be based on the organizational environment and the type of information security management operating 
in the firm. 
But these are not the only two information security standards.  In fact, the original BS 7799 has continued to 
evolve independently of ISO 17799, and now exists as a separate international standard (ISO/IEC 27001:2005).  
This standard has evolved toward the development of management systems for information security and provides 
a stronger basis for third party audit and certification.  It offers a managerially-oriented complement to the 
technologically-oriented ISO 17799.  
A variety of other general international standards exist, ranging from the more technical (e.g., the RFC2196 Site 
Security Handbook of the Internet Engineering Task Force) to the more abstract.  As an example of the later, the 
OECD Guidelines provide a direction for national legislation that seeks to create a proper security culture in 
organizations (2002) 
There are also a wide variety of national IT security standards.  These standards are generally developed for the 
purpose of mandating security requirements for the relevant government agencies.  In other words, government 
organizations are required to adhere to the nationally defined IT security standards.  Examples of these include 
the Australian Communications Security Instructions Number 33 (ACSI33) Security Guidelines for Australian 
Government IT Systems, the encyclopaedic US NIST 800 series standards, and the German Federal Agency for 
Security in Information Technology’s IT Baseline Protection Manual.   
While certain government agencies may be required to follow the appropriate national information security 
standards, the government standards setting agencies publish the standards to permit their adoption by non-
government organizations in the interest of promoting better information security nationwide or worldwide. The 
standards will almost always be followed by organizations with close commercial contracting ties to the 
government, and in some cases may be required where these commercial contractors are developing or using 
sensitive government information. 
In at least one case, government efforts to develop better government security have evolved into broader 
professional standards.  The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a series of monographs to promote best practices 
for managing information technology services.  This IT services orientation has led to a set of best practices that 
are integrated and process based.  These have clear objectives in the quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness 
for the delivery of IT services.  ITIL volumes include software asset management, planning for service 
management, etc.  There is a volume dedicated to security management that has all the elements required for an 
information security standard including process areas at strategic, tactical, and operational levels.  The volume 
encompasses security products, such as policies, processes, procedures, and work instructions (Weil, 2004). 
There are also industry standards that are mandated for compliance by organizations operating in those 
industries.  One good example of an industry standard is the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security 
Standard developed by Mastercard and Visa to impose minimum security standards on any organization 
processing credit card data (2005b). 
Although less relevant as a framework for information security management in information systems, there are 
standards that provide evaluation criteria for computer products.  Foremost among these standards is the 
Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408), developed by standard setting bodies from a variety of countries including 
Canada, France, Germany, The Netherlands, the UK, and the US. This standard provides assurance based on 
evaluation and active investigation of IT products or systems that are to be trusted.  It is distinctive in the value it 
assigns to expert evaluators and its emphasis on scope, depth, and rigor.  However, it has not been formally 
applied as an overall information security management standard, but rather focuses on the certification of 
products that might be acquired as components of a secure information system. 
In terms of specifying requirements for information systems security, many organizations could select any of the 
above information security standards.  Contingency theory would suggest that it might be possible to develop a 
set of universal criteria by which the ideally appropriate standard could be deduced from a set of organizational 
and environmental characteristics (Davis, 1982).  However, side-by-side comparisons of these standards are 
relatively rare and anecdotal (cf. von Solms, 2005, Roberts, 2006).  The lacuna in the literature may be caused by 
the dramatic difference between the standards. Each is based on differing frameworks, philosophies, and 
assumptions about information systems and their security.  Comparison criteria are likely to favour one or two of 
the standards over the rest in most situations.  Consequently the selection of the appropriate standard becomes a 
situational, ideographic problem.  The problem is exacerbated by the wide variety of available standards for 
adoption. 
This problem provides an unusual market setting for competition between the standards for adoption by 
“customers” in need of an externally validated security requirements definition.  However, few of these standards 
are developed by organizations with commercial goals that profit from discrete adoptions of their standards.  
Neither the standards nor their or originating organizations are intent on competition with other standards.  The 
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commercial competition arises from commercial organizations and IT service providers that develop specialized 
expertise in the area of one or more of the standards.  In this way the marketplace for the standards is shaped by 
the specialties and preferences of the service providers available to help organizations in adopting and applying a 
particular standard, and competing with other service providers with similar expertise or specialized expertise in 
competing standards. 
The presence of the service providers in a setting where potential adopters of security standards face a confusing 
array of highly situated alternatives makes this marketplace very real and very competitive.  In the presence of 
this marketplace, information security standards adoption is rarely a rational and obvious decision for each 
organization.  To a degree, the competitive nature of the standards marketplace is not well recognized by many 
organizations.  In fact, the selection of a security standard is akin to the selection of ideal product to match the 
adopting organization, its culture, its situation, its scope, and its economic profile. 
AUDIT FIRMS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATORS 
Because of the presence of government or industry regulations and guidelines, this marketplace is also inhabited 
by organizations and individuals connected with developing and enforcing these regulations.  For example, audit 
firms under SarbOx are charged with reviewing processes for assessing internal controls.  Note carefully that the 
external audits may not extend to actually reviewing the internal controls, but rather reviewing the processes for 
assessing internal controls.  This is an important distinction because the audit firm may directly evaluate the 
security standards adoption decision as a component for developing and assessing internal controls in IT systems.  
In other words, an auditor may well be required to evaluate whether an organization that adopted ISO/IEC 17799 
for assessing internal controls should have instead adopted CobIT. 
As a consequence, adoption decisions made in the information security standards marketplace may be subject to 
review by audit firms.  Because audit firms are required to be independent of the organizations they audit, these 
firms cannot consult in the adoption decision.  By regulation, at least under SarbOx, the audit firm cannot 
predetermine the safeguards standard adoption decision.  Organizations that adopt a security standard should be 
able to demonstrate in an external audit that the standard is the most ideal for the organization.  But inevitably, 
the organization must independently make this decision in the security standards marketplace. 
Government regulators may also be a distant factor in the security standards adoption decision.  For example, 
SarbOx Title I creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  This board is charged to 
register and review public accounting firms that provide external audit services to publicly held companies. The 
PCAOB has responsibilities for investigations and disciplinary actions for breaches of accounting standards.  
Ultimately, any lapse in audit independence could be subject to investigation and punishment by this board.  The 
PCAOB is an indirect factor in the standards marketplace by ensuring that organizational decisions about 
standards adoption are made independently from an external auditor. 
REORIENTED SECURITY DESIGN METHODS 
In the presence of stringent IT controls assessment by internal and external auditors, security standards become 
benchmarks for measuring internal control. This benchmarking drives the use of information security standards 
as a mechanism for specifying security controls requirements. This drive has forced security design methods to 
evolve. However, the evolution is a somewhat subtle one.  In general, the overall process for security safeguards 
specification is largely unchanged.  This generic process is shown in Table 2. 
 
Stage 1: Identify and evaluate system assets 
Stage 2: Identify and evaluate threats 
Stage 3: Identify possible controls 
Stage 4: Risk analysis 
Stage 5: Prioritize controls for implementation 
Stage 6: Implement and maintain controls 
Table 2. Generic security project stages (from Baskerville, 1993). 
Implementation of the generic stages varies with overall methodology and variations offer features that provide 
situated improvements.  An example of an instance of this generic model is shown in Table 3. 
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Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles  
      Process 1: Identify Senior Management Knowledge  
      Process 2: Identify Operational Area Knowledge 
      Process 3: Identify Staff Knowledge 
      Process 4: Create Threat Profiles 
 Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities  
      Process 5: Identify Key Components 
      Process 6: Evaluate Selected Components 
 Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans 
      Process 7: Conduct Risk Analysis 
      Process 8: Develop Protection Strategy 
Table 3.  Octave Method, Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (Alberts and 
Dorofee, 2001) 
Traditionally, risk analysis offered a form of economic cost-benefit analysis that could be used to justify the 
acquisition of a safeguard identified in earlier steps.  Risk analysis provided information about whether the cost 
of the safeguard would be greater than the probable losses without the safeguard in place.  If the cost of the 
safeguard was lower than its potential benefits, the safeguard was acquired.  What is philosophically important in 
this process is that risk analysis provided the means by which a decision was made to adopt a safeguard.  
Theoretically, without the risk analysis, safeguards were unjustified, and none were adopted. 
What changes in both the generic model and its instances is the usefulness of the risk analysis in the presence of 
indirect regulatory mandates for IT security controls.  Regulatory mandates define a requirement for the 
assessment of information assurance.  This required assessment results in the selection and adoption of an 
information security standard from the standards marketplace.  The adopted security standard defines a set of IT 
security requirements in the form of various information systems security safeguards and controls.  In cases 
where security safeguards, as defined in standards, are not implemented then at some point assurance auditors 
will compare internal IT controls with those in established standards.  This comparison will generate exceptions 
where the absence of controls indicates a failure to comply with standards.  Such exceptions become urgent 
requirements in the next round of security safeguards specification. 
Importantly, the presence of regulations and standards shapes a default decision to adopt all safeguards defined 
as appropriate in the standards.  The role of risk analysis now changes.  Risk analysis can provide information 
about safeguards that have been recommended in the standards but are economically unjustifiable when 
compared to the probable benefit.  This risk analysis evidence can be presented to assurance auditors to explain 
why the exception is justifiable.  In other words, risk analysis is used as a mechanism by which an organization 
might choose not to adopt certain safeguards and controls as defined by the standards.  Theoretically, without the 
risk analysis, all safeguards are justified, and all are adopted. 
In this way, compliance with standards reorients typical security design methods.  The presence of regulatory 
mandates and standards for information security changes the default decision and changes the role of risk 
analysis in information security management.  Before regulatory mandates and standards, risk analysis was used 
to justify the adoption of the safeguard.  After regulatory mandates and standards, risk analysis is used to justify a 
decision not to adopt a safeguard.  The inversion of the default decision and the changing role of risk analysis 
and information security is an important one.  Previous research is shown that only about 25% of organizations 
are likely to practice risk analysis and in a methodical way.  Prior to regulatory mandates and standards, this 
meant that organizations were in danger of having inadequate security and safeguards in place because of a lack 
of risk analysis to justify the adoption of these controls.  After regulatory mandates and standards, organizations 
are in danger of adopting too much security, and far too many safeguards and controls than economically 
justifiable and thereby unnecessary for due care in their business. 
DISCUSSION 
Legislation intended to improve public disclosure of organizational operating profiles has developed substantial 
changes in the manner in which IT security controls requirements are specified.  The economy of IT controls has 
been reversed, meaning that organizations working to justify controls must now work to justify avoiding controls.  
While this reversal certainly improves the security of IT systems, it opens up more possibilities for IT systems 
that are overly expensive.  Such expensive IT systems may thereby diminish the competitiveness of the overall 
organization.  If there is a reduction in competitiveness for compliant firms, there are serious implications for the 
ethics and culture of the professions involved in developing compliance. 
If the burden of the mandated IT systems security leads to diminished competitiveness, the situation is not likely 
to prevail in the long term.  Uncompetitive organizations must reorganize or fail.  One possible avenue for 
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reorganization regards “creative” or misleading compliance (Cooper and Deo, 2005, p. 162).  Creative 
compliance is an endemic problem that creates cycles of regulatory failure.  Existing management systems endure 
regulatory reforms, and continue to promote professionals who control and thwart new regulations.  Such 
management systems can exploit, for example, the IT security standards marketplace.  Inappropriate, ineffective, 
but cheaper, security standards might be adopted in order to reduce the overt requirements for security 
safeguards.  For example, an organization might choose to adopt the narrower CobIT standard where their 
situation calls for the broader, more process-oriented ISO 17799.  This adoption could reduce the overall security 
costs without recourse to extensive risk analysis.  Auditors and regulators could be satisfied and security costs 
reduced, but undue information risks may result because the wrong standards are adopted. 
Another possible way that creative compliance can exploit existing management systems would be to adapt 
security design methods to streamline processes that justify internal controls exceptions.  For example, 
“improved” tools for the automation of risk analysis that more frequently undervalue risks would create a larger 
number of economically justified controls exceptions.  Such undervaluation of risk could effectively rebalance 
the IT safeguards economy closer to its original (and more competitive) state. 
Creative compliance arises because standards and regulatory environments represent technical and political 
dimensions of corporate governance.  The more important dimensions are the ethical and cultural aspects 
(Robins, 2006).  The current cycle of regulatory reform will progress steadily toward a new cycle of regulatory 
failure unless the professions correct the ethical and cultural flaws that will inevitably abuse management systems 
to defeat costly regulation. 
In terms of correcting the professions’ ethical and cultural flaws in the case of IT security safeguards, IT 
professionals would seem to have a large degree of progress available.  Observations by the audit profession that 
IT professionals lack knowledge in information security controls (Cannon and Growe, 2004, Lanz and Tie, 2004) 
are confirmed by studies in security awareness (possibly the most prevalent information security organizational 
policy).  A recent survey by the Computer Research Institute reports that most security respondents believe that 
security awareness training is important, yet on average, they don't believe their organizations invest enough in it 
(Anonymous, 2005).  This result is not surprising, since the security awareness has a very high ROI, and yet is 
underrepresented in the literature: 
“Additionally, I fear that too many security training and awareness efforts are sub par. Some 
organizations' security training and awareness programs are, bluntly put, pathetic -- they simply 
present platitudes about security to their captive audiences instead of teaching things that could and 
should make a practical difference in each attendee's daily job. Many programs are (like so many 
security practices) out of alignment with the organization's business goals and/or out of date with 
current technology.” (Schultz, 2004, p. 2) 
As measured by the status of security awareness training, there is room for improvement in the ethical and 
cultural frames of IT security professionals.  If the ethics and culture are poorly developed, the effective 
implementation of standards adoption will be limited.  The implications suggest it is quite possible that the 
current overzealous attention focussed on information security controls by regulatory reforms will dissipate into 
creative compliance with little lasting impact on the effective internal controls in an organization’s information 
systems. 
CONCLUSION 
An organizational decision to adopt an information security standard is one taken in a complex marketplace of 
competing standards, competing service providers, competing security design methods, and competing national 
and international legislative requirements.  The decision, and the security safeguards adoptions that are implied 
by this decision, are reviewed by closely-watched internal and external auditors whose actions are subject to 
further review by government regulators.   Far from being a straightforward, rational, technical decision, the 
decision to adopt a security standard is problematic for contingency criteria, and highly situational.   
Once standards are adopted, firms subject to close oversight of internal IT controls will find that the nature of 
their security design methods is changed by the adoption.  Where previously risk analysis was necessary to justify 
controls acquisition, risk analysis is now necessary to avoid unnecessary controls acquisition.  The default setting 
is the broad acquisition/implementation of all recommended safeguards in the adopted security standard.  As a 
result, the overhead for IT controls compliance is likely to rise for organizations falling under tight regulation 
controls without more careful attention to the risk analysis component in security design methods.  
The reaction to the rising overhead may also include less ethical behavior than improved risk analysis. IT 
professionals and system auditors may succumb to the alternative of creative compliance with standards. This 
kind of compliance means that organizations would ultimately make misleading public statements about their IT 
security. Such intentional misstatements were most certainly not the intended effect of the more extensive 
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requirements for disclosure. Yet this outcome can easily occur if the responsible IT professionals fail to fully 
understand the security standards adoption decision, and the complex marketplace within which this decision is 
taken.   
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